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LEGAL PROFESSION-STANDING FOR ADMISSION-
STANDARDS RELATING TO ADMISSION REQUIRE A RATIONAL
CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICANT'S FITNESS OR CAPACITY TO
PRACTICE LAW; INVESTIGATION INTO MORAL CHARACTER TO
BE LIMITED TO DETERMINING WHETHER THE APPLICANT WILL
OBSTRUCT JUSTICE OR ACT UNSCRUPULOUSLY AS AN OFFICER
OF THE COURT. Hallinan v, Committee of Bar Examiners (Calif.
1966).
Terence Hallinan was refused certification for admission to practice
law in California by the Committee of Bar Examiners upon a finding
that he was not of "good moral character."' The Committee's de-
termination was based on Hallinan's beliefs and activities in connec-
tion with "civil disobedience" and, in particular, several misdemeanor
convictions arising from these activities.2 In addition, Hallinan's past
record included several fistfights and other conduct which the Com-
mittee held indicated a disregard for the law and a propensity for vio-
lence.3 The Committee's decision was made after lengthy hearings
I "To be certified to the Supreme Court for admission and a license to practice law,
a person ... shall: ... (c) Be of good moral character." CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE,
§ 6060(c) (West 1962).
2 The reasons given by the Committee in refusing to certify Hallinan were: -(1)
[H]e now has and has demonstrated over a period of many years, a continuing willing-
ness and tendency, without reasonable justification, to employ against the persons and
property of others unreasonable force and the threat thereof; (2) he has recently and
continuously over a period of years shown disrespect and willful disregard for the
rights, property, and physical safety of others; (3) in his improper and sometimes
criminal use of force, the threat of force, and forceful resistance to arrest, and in his
knowing disobedience of the order of a Court, he has shown a disrespect for the law
and judicial officers, which exceeds the bounds of his acknowledged right to hold and
espouse, to advocate, advertise, and to participate in mass demonstrations to achieve the
acceptance of any social, political or philosophical views or beliefs in a peaceful and
non-violent manner; (4) the record as a whole establishes that he lacks candor and
truthfulness; and (5) the evidence in the record tending to show that he has good
moral character is outweighed by the evidence that he is not entitled to the high regard
and confidence of the public and that he does not possess those qualities of character
and moral fitness requisite to admission to practice law in California." Hallinan v.
Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Adv. Cal. 485, 488-89 n.2, 421 P.2d 76, 79 n.2, 55
Cal. Rptr. 228, 231 n.2 (1966).
The first activity which resulted in an arrest occurred in England in 1960 during a
peace demonstration led by Bertrand Russell, when Hallinan was arrested and formally
charged with "blocking a footpath." He pleaded nolo contendere and paid a fine of £1.
In 1963, he spent the summer assisting the registration of Negro voters in Mississippi.
He was arrested twice during that period, for loitering and for littering public areas,
but neither instance resulted in a conviction. In San Francisco, he was arrested six times
in connection with civil-rights activities, four of the charges being dismissed and two
resulting in misdemeanor convictions. All of these demonstrations involved picketing
or "sit-ins" at various business establishments alleged to have followed discriminatory
hiring practices. 65 Adv. Cal. 493-95, 421 P.2d 82-84, 55 Cal. Rptr. 234-36.
3 Evidence was introduced by the State Bar which indicated that Hallinan had been
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before a three-man subcommittee and a review of the entire record of
the previous hearings by the full Committee in which additional
evidence was produced.4 Before the Committee ended its proceedings,
Hallinan petitioned the California Supreme Court to order the Com-
mittee to make its decision immediately and halt any further inquiry
into the question of his admission to the bar. Hallinan also requested
that the Supreme Court review the proceedings before the Committee
and admit him to practice. In the meantime, the Committee formally
made its recommendation that he not be admitted.
The California Supreme Court, in admitting Hallinan to the Cali-
fornia Bar held: (1) Standards relating to admission to the bar must
have a rational connection with an applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law; (2) the investigation into moral character should be
limited to determining whether the applicant, if admitted, will ob-
struct justice or otherwise act unscrupulously as an officer of the
Court; (3) the beliefs and activities of Hallinan with respect to "civil
disobedience" did not constitute grounds to exclude him from the
practice of law because of a lack of "good moral character"; and, (4)
there is no simple guide to determine the moral character required
for the practice of law-the particular circumstances must be ex-
amined carefully to determine their relevance to the practice of law.
Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Adv. Cal. 485, 421 P.2d
76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
The Hallinan court was concerned primarily with whether certain
acts of "civil disobedience," and perhaps more important, Hallinan's
beliefs concerning "civil disobedience" indicated a lack of "good
involved in nine fistfights during the period from 1953 to 1964. The court disregarded
the six prior to 1959 as "youthful indiscretions." The remaining three occurred while
Hallinan was a law student. 65 Adv. Cal. 503, 421 P.2d 89, 55 Cal. Rptr. 241.
4 The Committee's findings included the following:
(1) [A]pplicant exhibits a disrespect for an organized system based upon the
rule of law and reserves to himself the right to decide when, how and which
laws shall be obeyed.(a) It is Applicant's belief that a violation of law is justified if done for
the purpose of forcing negotiations designed to what he believes to be a de-
sirable goal....
(b) It is Applicant's belief that a violation of an injunction or of a law isjustified, even though such violation is not in an attempt to establish the un-
constitutionality of the particular law violated, if the violator has determined
in his own mind that such violation will tend to bring about what he considers
to be a desirable result ...
(c) It is Applicant's belief that it is proper and necessary to take action
outside of the existing framework of laws if such action will tend to accom-
plish a change in a law which he considers to be so anachronistic as to be
unable to fit into the existing political situation in this country and if he be-
lieves that enough people agree with him. . ..
Petition for Review, Mandate, and Injunction, Exhibit C, at 3, 65 Adv. Cal. 485, 421
P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228.
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moral character" which would provide a rational basis for exclusion
from the practice of law in California. This appears to be the first
case in which this issue has been raised in connection with admission
to the bar. A difficulty in resolving this issue is that "moral character"
should not be determined entirely by a subjective judgment.- For the
court to resolve the problem, it was necessary to establish a standard
of the moral character required to practice law and to establish what
evidence is necessary under the standard to establish the moral char-
acter of the applicant.
In passing the State Bar Act and its subsequent amendments, 6 the
legislature set up standards regulating the practice of law, but regu-
lation of the bar has remained a judicial function.7 As the Hallinan
court pointed out:
Virtually all of the admission and disciplinary cases in which we
have upheld decisions of the State Bar to refuse to admit applicants
or to disbar, suspend or otherwise censure members of the bar have
5 For a discussion of some of the problems which arise in evaluating "moral char-
acter" based on political beliefs, see Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to
the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480 (1953).
6 For a discussion of the practice prior to the State Bar Act, see McMurray, Seventy-
five Years of California Jurisprudence, 13 CALIF. L. REv. 445 (1925). As the need for
an expert bar was recognized, a Committee of Bar Examiners was established to ex-
amine the applicant's qualifications and make recommendations to the California Su-
preme Court concerning his admission. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6064 (West 1962).
Upon certification by the Committee, the applicant is admitted by order of the California
Supreme Court. The court will ordinarily follow the recommendation of the Committee,
but the findings of the Bar Examiners are not binding on the court.
Regarding the examination into knowledge of the law, only the fact that an applicant
was prevented from a fair opportunity to pass the examination will provide grounds
for review. But whether his failure is for lack of knowledge of law or lack of good
moral character, an unsuccessful applicant may seek a review by the California Supreme
Court. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6066 (West 1962) ; CAL. RULES OF COURT,
RULE 69; see also In re Admission to Practice Law, 1 Cal. 2d 61, 33 P.2d 829 (1934);
RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTicE LAW, RULE X. Cases in which the court
has followed an adverse recommendation by the State Bar include In re Garland, 219
Cal. 661, 28 P.2d 354 (1934) (failure to disclose prior misconduct including criminal
acts and illegal practice of law) ; Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697 (1930)
(where insufficient proof was offered to sustain burden or overturn recommendation) ;
Bailey v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 476, 288 P. 433 (1930) (concealment of prior disbarment
at time of admission upheld as grounds for disbarment). However, the court overruled
the adverse recommendation by the State Bar in In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 98 P.2d
489 (1940) ; In re Jung, 13 Cal. 2d 199, 88 P.2d 679 (1939) ; Warbasse v. State Bar,
219 Cal. 566, 28 P.2d 19 (1933); State Bar v. Rollinson, 213 Cal. 36, 1 P.2d 428
(1931); In re McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 P. 47 (1930); Harrington v. State Bar, 210
Cal. 514, 292 P. 456 (1930).
7 Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018, (1929). "Admission to prac-
tice is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial
function ...." Id. at 443, 281 P. at 1020. "[T]he legislature may put reasonable re-
strictions upon constitutional functions of the courts provided they do not defeat or
materially impair the exercise of those functions." Id. at 444, 281 P. at 1020. See also
In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935). In this respect, regulation of attor-
neys is unlike that of other professions.
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involved ads which bear upon the individual's manifest dishonesty
and thereby provide a reasonable basis for the condusion that the
applicant or attorney cannot be relied upon to fulfill the moral
obligations incumbent upon members of the legal profession.8
Previous cases have usually involved advocacy of violent overthrow
of the Government or membership in the Communist Party or other
group legislatively defined to advocate such a policy.' The subcom-
mittee expressly found that Hallinan was not a member of such a
group.10
The facts in Hallinan were not in issue. There was no attempt by
Hallinan to conceal his activities, although he did try to justify his
civil rights activities on moral and political grounds. But on the
particular facts, the Committee's analysis may have been: (1)Halli-
nan had violated the law, although in a nonviolent manner; (2) he
also displayed a propensity for violence; (3) therefore, he might vio-
late the law in a violent fashion. In reviewing the record, however,
the California Supreme Court found that "petitioner explicitly re-
pudiated violent civil disobedience and that all of the demonstrations
in which he engaged were peaceful. The sincerity of petitioner's be-
liefs in non-violent civil disobedience and his high motivation in this
regard are unchallenged by respondent.""
"Good moral character" has been held to be "an absence of
proven conduct or acts" which have been historically considered as
manifestations of "moral turpitude."'12 A common definition of
8 65 Adv. Cal. at 510, 421 P.2d at 93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
9 E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Member-
ship in the Communist Party or other group advocating violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment is now a separate ground for exclusion in California. CAL. Bus, & PROF. CODn,
§ 6064.1 (West 1962); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d (1959);
In re Anastaplo, 3 Il. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954).
10 Report, Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of Bar Examiners' Hearing
Subcommittee in the matter of Terence Hallinan. 65 Adv. Cal. 485, 421 P.2d 76, 55
Cal. Rptr. 228.
11 65 Adv. Cal. at 499, 421 P.1d at 86, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
12 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) ; Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ("moral turpitude" used as the relevant criterion
in construing a New Mexico statute requiring a showing of good moral character) ; see
also In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948).
The Konigsberg Court, in discussing the meaning of "good moral character," said:
[T~he term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost
unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the atti-
tudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification,
which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a dan-
gerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to
practice law. 353 U.S. at 263.
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"moral turpitude" is "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and man.""a Such a definition does not
add much certainty, but does indicate that the conduct in question
must be of an extreme nature. In this regard, one is usually concerned
with crimes involving "moral turpitude" which have traditionally
centered around fraudulent or deceitful practices. Crimes affecting
the administration of justice have been added to that same class.14 In
addition, some definitions of moral turpitude include acts involving
the violation of a rule of public policy or morals, and all offenses
which affect the administration of justice.' 5
Although "moral turpitude" may be indicated by violations of the
law, it is clear that not all violations of statutes, ordinances or even
public morals give reason to question one's moral character. Minor
offenses committed in the heat of anger or mental infirmity have been
held not to be sufficient grounds for disbarment; 6 the same result
has been reached regarding bad manners, bad language,' 7 and even
sexual immorality.' 8 But when conduct renders an attorney unable to
carry on his responsibility as a member of the legal profession, it can
be the basis of disciplinary action, and if great enough, possible dis-
barment It is to anticipate and prevent such situations from occur-
ring that standards for admission have been established.
13 In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 841, 415 P.2d 800, 802, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914
(1966); In re Boyd, 48 Cal. 2d 69, 70, 307 P.2d 625, 626 (1957); In re Craig, 12 Cal.
2d 93, 97, 82 P.2d 422, 444 (1938); In re Henry, 15 Idaho 755, 757, 99 P. 1054, 1055
(1909); Trades & General Ins. Co. v. Russell, 99 S.W.2d 1079, 1084 (Texas 1936);
14 A.. JUR., Criminal Law § 5 (1938); 27A WoRDs AND PHRASES, Moral Turpitude
192-93. See also definitions in In re McAllister, 14 Cal. 2d 602, 95 P.2d 932, (1939) ;
In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937) ; Marsh v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 303,
291 P. 583 (1930).
14 "Moral turpitude' has included all crimes embraced in the Roman concept of
crimen falsi, Huff v. Anderson, 212 Ga. 32, 90 S.E.2d 329 (1955). Crimen falsi is
defined in DIGEST 48.10; BLACK'S LAw DIcToNPARY 446 (4th ed. 1951).
15 See Matzenbaugh v. People, 194 II. 108, 62 N.E. 546 (1901), which characterizes
as crimen falsi only those offenses involving dishonesty which injuriously affect the
administration of public justice.
16 In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940); see Baker v. Miller, 236
Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1955).
17 People v. Palmer, 61 Ill. 255, 256 (1871). "The court is not . . . a censor of
morals, so as to require it to pronounce upon the style of manners and conversation
which becomes an honorable member of the legal profession."
18 People ex rel. Black v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807 (1919) (frequenting
disorderly house not sufficient in itself, but may be relevant in connection with other
evidence).
'9 In re Washington, 82 Kan. 829, 109 P. 700 (1910). It is not necessary that
misconduct be in professional activities. See e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882)
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The relevance of a conviction in determining moral character has
often been considered. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude is usually given great weight, even to the extent of giving con-
clusive weight to a conviction to establish moral turpitude.20 Yet it is
not the conviction itself which is important, but the nature of the acts
which resulted in the conviction.2 Even when an indictment does not
result in a conviction, the circumstances may still provide a basis for
a determination of bad character.22
The existence of misconduct prior to admission should not, by
itself, be grounds for disbarment after one has been admitted to
practice, 8 unless it had been deliberately concealed at the time of
admission, in which case the concealment itself would be grounds for
disbarment.24 What is important is to determine the relationship that
conduct has upon the fitness of an attorney to practice law. In dis-
cussing Hallinan's past conduct, the court declared: "Although peti-
tioner's past behavior may not be praiseworthy it does not reflect
upon his honesty and veracity nor does it show him unfit for the
proper discharge of the duties of an attorney. ' 2 A determination
concerning admission to practice law should not be used to impose
additional punishment for misconduct.
(participation in lynching); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 195, 75 N.W.2d 644, 648
(1956), where the court said:
This does not mean that the Court has the function or right to regulate the
morals, habits or private lives of lawyers, who like other citizens are free to
act and to be responsible for their acts, but when the morals, habits or conduct
of a lawyer demonstrate unfitness to practice law or adversely affect the proper
administration of justice, then the Court may have the duty to suspend or re-
voke the privilege to practice law in order to protect the public.
See also In re Hilton, 48 Utah 172, 158 P. 691 (1916).
20 In some cases the conviction is prima facie evidence of moral turpitude. State v.
O'Leary, 207 Wis. 297, 241 N.W. 621 (1932) ; In re Solicitor, 61 L.T.R. (n.s.) 842
(Q.B. 1842), a/I'd (1889) 37 W.L.R. 598 (C.A.); see also In re Weare (1893) 2 Q.B.
(Eng.) 439.
21 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Meyerovitz, 278 IM. 356, 116 N.E. 189
(1917); People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 735 (1905); cf.
Deneen v. Coleman, 210 Ill. 79, 71 N.E. 693 (1904).
22 In State ex rel. Guille v. Chapman, 11 Ohio 430 (1842), a verdict in a civil
action for libel finding that an attorney had committed theft was given the same effect
as a conviction in determining his fitness to practice law, although it was not a con-
viction for theft.
23 In re Lowenthal, 61 Cal. 122 (1882) (California Supreme Court order admitting
to practice held to be in the nature of a judgment on requisite qualifications; therefore,
attack cannot be made on previous character absent fraudulent concealment).
24 Bailey v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 476, 288 P.433 (1930). (Conduct having a direct
bearing on the present character of the individual, even though it was not considered
at the time of admission, might still be admissible evidence to determine the present
character. See Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930).
25 65 Adv. Cal. at 510, 421 P.2d at 94, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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To the extent that acts of civil disobedience involve violations of
the law it is altogether necessary and proper that the violators be
punished. But criminal prosecution, not exclusion from the bar, is
the appropriate means of punishing such offenders.26
The principal question the Hallinan court had to decide was
whether Hallinan's past acts demonstrated that he, as an attorney,
would obstruct the administration of justice. It was to this problem
that Hallinan's convictions were relevant.
Although any intentional violation of the law might be condemned,
the Hallinan court noted that "every intentional violation is not, ipso
facto, grounds for excluding an individual from membership in the
legal profession."27 It is not always dear what the law actually is,
for there are many instances in which "... .something which looks like
law, which has passed through the legislature, which is printed where
laws are printed, is being violated."28 Yet the activity may not have
been in violation of a law, since that which appeared to be law was
not in fact a law. Even if a law were broken, since law and morality
are not always synonymous, a crime may not involve moral unfitness.
Were it not for intentional violations of the law, the law would
cease to develop. An intentional violation of the law can be consid-
ered in several aspects. When violation is made in the belief that the
law is not valid, it is difficult to say categorically that such a violation
displays a lack of moral character, as few would label the patriots of
the American Revolution persons of "bad moral character" because
of their violations of what was at that time the law.
In any case, it is clear that the courts have been unwilling to
place restraints on an individual's beliefs and acts which do not
relate to his fitness to practice law, even when the beliefs and acts
may lead one to counsel that constitutionally questionable laws shall
not be obeyed. For it is the activity and its result which establishes
bad moral character. Lawyers have long pursued activities in-
volving politics and social reform, and, within wide limits, have been
allowed to speak as freely as any other citizen. 9 It is only when these
26 65 Adv. Cal. at 500, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239; see also People ex
rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Meyerovitz, 278 IIl. 356, 116 N.E. 189 (1917). The distinc-
tion between punishment and determining qualifications is discussed in Ex parte Gar-
land, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333 (1867).
27 65 Adv. Cal. at 498, 421 P.2d at 85, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
28 Black, The Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American
Institutions of Government, 43 TExAs L. REv. 492, 499 (1965).
29 In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956). "But for the right to speak
freely, there is responsibility for abuse of the right. ... [I]n the case of a lawyer an
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activities affect a lawyer's fitness to practice law that a serious ques-
tion is raised. Unpopular beliefs regarding theories of government
and economics, as long as they have not been expressed in such a way
as to lead others to violate laws, should never be used to preclude one
from practicing law.30 The United States Supreme Court has said:
One with innocent motives, who honestly believes a law is un-
constitutional and, therefore, not obligatory, may well counsel that
the law shall not be obeyed; that its command shall be resisted
until a court shall have held it valid .... 31
Unpatriotic conduct which is not treason, nor contrary to the re-
sponsibilities of any attorney, is not grounds for disbarment. 2 But
public advocacy of sabotage and criminal syndicalism as a means of
effecting social and industrial reform, 3 and acts of sedition, par-
ticularly when there is a violation of a statute,3 4 have been used to
exclude persons from practice.
The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing a refusal to admit
an applicant to practice law in California because of his refusal to
answer questions which were alleged to relate to his loyalty, stated:
We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their
own bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise
this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such a
way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or associa-
tion. A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy
objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order
to obtain that goal. It is also important both to the society and the
bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak and
act as members of an Independent Bar.35
The question of moral character may not be as much one of absolute
loyalty to an existing government as it is of complete loyalty to the
process of law. Seeking change in the law or the system of political
abuse of the right of free speech may be some index of his character or fitness to be a
lawyer." Id. at 196, 75 N.W.2d at 648.
30 "With ...beliefs and opinions ... the courts have nothing to do, unless . ..
[they] were uttered under circumstances and in a manner calculated to lead others to
violate and disregard existing laws." In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 207, 112 A. 478, 479
(1921).
31 Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 493-94 (1945).
32 In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196 P. 670 (1921).
33 Ex parle Wall, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 265 (1882) (active participation in a lynch-
ing); State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Graves, 73 Ore. 331, 144 P. 484 (1914) (mob vio-
lence) ; In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 P. 288 (1925) (public advocacy of sabotage
and criminal syndicalism).
34 In re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 P. 40 (1920).
35 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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government is not precluded, for our system has been wisely pro-
vided with built-in methods for change; but certain types of change
are not compatible with the law. In discussing a conviction under the
Smith Act,3 the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States,37 felt that
its purpose "is to protect existing Government, not from change by
peaceful, lawful and constitutional means, but from change by vio-
lence, revolution and terrorism." 38 The Hallinan court emphasized
the nonviolent beliefs of Hallinan, pointing out that all of the civil
rights demonstrations in which he participated were peaceful."
Having eliminated the question of "violence," it seems clear that
beliefs or activities involving nonviolent civil disobedience are not in
themselves conclusive evidence of a lack of "good moral character,"
even if they involve a violation of the law. It is in this regard that
additional evidence concerning Hallinan's fights was introduced by
the Committee for the purpose of showing a disregard by Hallinan
for the law and "a propensity for violence." The court dismissed as
"youthful indiscretions," the fights which occurred before Hallinan
was 22 years of age. Concerning the three fights which occurred while
Hallinan was a student in law school, the court'held:
[E]ven if we ignore the evidence of provocation or other ex-
tenuating circumstances . . . [these fights] do not demonstrate
such, "baseness, vileness and depravity" as to amount to moral
turpitude.
36 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964), formerly 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
37 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
38 Id. at 501; see also Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. S.A.C.B., 380
U.S. 513 (1965); American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. S.A.C.B.,
380 U.S. 503 (1965); Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Communist Party of the United States v. S.A.C.B., 367
U.S. 1 (1961).
Even violence or rebellion may not be evidence of bad moral character. In Ex parle
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333 (1866), one who had fought for the Confederacy was
allowed to practice. An opposite position is seen in In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 572
(1954), where an applicant was refused admission to the Illinois bar because of his
unwillingness to resort to violence to serve in the Armed Forces. The United State Su-
preme Court held that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, that the belief in
non-violence made it impossible to take the oath required of an attorney, did not violate
the fourteenth amendment, and made an analogy to the federal requirement that an
alien who will not pledge military service cannot be admitted to citizenship. See also
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
In a strong dissent to the Summers case, Mr. Justice Black said:
The conclusion seems to me inescapable that if Illinois can bar this petitioner
from the practice of law it can bar every person from every public occupation
solely because he believes in non-resistance rather than in force. For a lawyer
is no more subject to call for military duty than a plumber, a highway worker,
a Secretary of State, or a prison chaplain. 325 U.S. at 575.
39 65 Adv. Cal. at 499, 421 P.2d at 86, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
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The nature of these acts, moreover, does not bear a direct relation-
ship to petitioner's fitness to practice law.40
While there are limits even to fundamental constitutional rights, 41
conduct and beliefs which are not of the level of "moral turpitude"
cannot be used to exclude one from the legal profession unless it is
dearly shown that they demonstate unfitness to practice. Past conduct
may be of little or no significance, especially when it is in the distant
past.4 It may have been true that Hallinan, in the past, had a "propen-
sity for violence." However, the court was impressed with the fact
that since Hallinan had become active in the civil rights movement,
[H]is peaceful conduct in situations fraught with tension which
might be expected to provoke to violence an individual so disposed
is some indication that petitioner has, in fact, overcome such a
propensity.43
The importance of Hallinan may only be that the court did not
hold, as a matter of law, that convictions for what may have been
intentional violations of the law resulting from participation in civil-
disobedience activities show a "lack of moral character." On the other
hand, neither has the court condoned such activity. What it has done
is to stress the importance of conduct and its relationship to the prac-
tice of law. Subjectivity can never be eliminated in making a predic-
tion of future behavior, but the court has indicated that where there is
a question of reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the ac-
cused. Thus, a final determination regarding exclusion from practice
must show its relevance to the practice of law. In this changing
40 Id. at 510, 421 P.2d at 93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
Why should we have any kind of requirements for admission to practice? The
only justification for such requirements lies in the public interest and the legal
profession has from time immemorial been looked upon as affected with a
public interest in the highest sense of that term ...
Kirkwood, Trends in Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 7 CALIF. S. BAR. J. 80,
85 (1932).
41 "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
42 In Deneen v. Coleman, the Illinois Supreme Court, discussing the relevance of a
prior conviction, declared:
Thirteen years had elapsed between the time of conviction and the time of
application for admission to this bar, and to hold, as an abstract proposition
of law, that an error once made is to forever damn the man who makes it, is
a thing we are not disposed to do. The opportunity and the hope held out to
all men to repent and correct their ways, if they have ever been wrong, are
the only possible incentives the law can know that can work the reformation
of men who have gone wrong.
210 Ill. 79, 71 N.E. 693 (1904).
43 65 Adv. Cal. at 511, 421 P.2d at 94, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
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society, it is important to periodically reexamine the standards govern-
ing the practice of law, not to lessen the duties and responsibilities of
the lawyer to his client and to society, but to allow lawyers to actively
participate in a changing society. If limits to a lawyer's freedom are to
be imposed, as they must, these should be based on more than un-
popular opinions and activities.
Roy W. PAUL, JR.
